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RECONCILIATION AND VIOLENCE: HANNAH ARENDT ON 
HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 
     
I. INTRODUCTION  
A distinction frequently used to be drawn between Hannah Arendt’s work as a 
political philosopher and as a historically-minded critic of political culture.1 Recently, 
however, scholars have stressed continuities between the historical focus of The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and the philosophical tenor of her later writings.2 
Arendt has come to be seen as a thoroughly historical thinker, if not a historian. Yet 
her writings from the early 1950s, in which she constructed a historical sensibility 
grounded in readings of Marx and Hegel, have mostly been ignored. In these writings 
– part of an ambitious, unfinished book project entitled “Totalitarian Elements of 
Marxism” – she sought to identify aspects of Marxism that had hastened the 
emergence of totalitarianism, without condemning Marx’s thought in its entirety.3 The 
result was a series of investigations into the philosophy of history that formed the 
basis for many subsequent articles and monographs.4 While some aspects of these 
writings – her critique of Marx, notion of ideology, and developing political theory – 
have been examined, little has been said about the notion of history with which she 
tied them together.5 This essay will show that Arendt’s notion of historical 
understanding centred on an uneasy relationship between the need for reconciliation 
                                                
* For their comments on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank Ronald Beiner, Melissa 
Lane, Samuel Moyn, Christopher Ro, Martin Ruehl and the anonymous readers for MIH. I have also 
benefited from numerous discussions with Giovanni Menegalle. 
1 While The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) has been taken to exemplify Arendt’s historical bent, 
The Human Condition (1958) has been treated as a move to a form of republicanism in the civic 
humanist tradition, concerned above all with public speech and action and political freedom. For a 
discussion of this divide in Arendt scholarship see Richard H. King and Dan Stone, “Introduction”, in 
Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide, ed. Richard H. 
King and Dan Stone (Oxford, 2007), 5-6. 
2 Pivotal in eroding this separation have been the numerous essays collected in King and Stone, 
Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History; See also Karuna Mantena, “Genealogies of Catastrophe: 
Arendt on the Logic and Legacy of Imperialism”, in Politics in Dark Times: Encounters With Hannah 
Arendt, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge, 2010).  
3 Hannah Arendt, “Project: Totalitarian Elements in Marxism” Project Outline (1951), Washington 
D.C., Library of Congress, Arendt Papers, Box 64 (hereinafter cited as LoC); Hannah Arendt to H.A. 
Moe, 29 Jan. 1953, LoC/Washington, Box 22, 012641. 
4 The chapter on Marx in The Human Condition, for example. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
(Chicago, 1998), 79-136. 
5 For the most comprehensive study of these writings, see Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A 
Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge, 1994); See also Bhikhu Parekh, “Hannah 
Arendt’s Critique of Marx”, in Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, ed. Melvyn A. Hill 
(New York, 1979). 
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with the past, and a thorough rejection of twentieth-century violence. Her later 
attempts to theorise forms of judgment and action that avoided voluntarism and 
fatalism can be better understood in this light. 
“Totalitarian Elements of Marxism” was a continuation of Arendt’s endeavour to 
comprehend the emergence of the “idea of humanity”. In Origins she had described 
the contribution of “race-imperialism” to the collapse of the nation-state and the 
international order. Race-imperialism along with antisemitism had enabled the 
totalitarian assault on human diversity and the unforeseen recognition of a common 
humanity.6 In her Marx project she extended this global and historical focus, treating 
the rise of labour, “the social” and the eclipse of the public sphere as preconditions for 
totalitarianism.7 The categories of labour and work, she argued, grounded modern 
historical consciousness. Marx’s interpretation of the Hegelian philosophy of history 
emerged from this background, mandating the violent transformation of humanity in 
accordance with a teleology grounded in the emancipation of labour.8 In refining her 
theory of totalitarianism, she specified how particular political constructions of 
temporality could justify violence. 
 In grappling with the significance of totalitarianism, Arendt articulated a 
concept of reconciliation as a way of dealing with the worst of human experience.9 
Moralistic forms of understanding that elicited straightforward condemnations, or 
comprehended concentration camps through precedents such as slavery – something 
                                                
6 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York, 1951), 121-302; Hannah Arendt, 
“Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility”, in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, 
Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (2005), 131; For the international dimensions of Arendt’s 
thought, see Patricia Owens, Between War and Politics: International Relations and the Thought of 
Hannah Arendt (Oxford, 2009); Robert Fine, Political Investigations: Hegel, Marx, Arendt (London, 
2001), 151-65. 
7 Hannah Arendt, “Concern With Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought”, in Essays in 
Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 
2005); Hannah Arendt, “Dream and Nightmare”, in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, 
Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 2005); Hannah Arendt, “Europe and the 
Atom Bomb”, in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. 
Jerome Kohn (New York, 2005).  
8 Hannah Arendt, “The Impact of Marx” (lecture notes), Washington D.C., Library of Congress, 
Hannah Arendt Papers, Box 68. 
9 For discussions of Arendt’s notion of reconciliation, see Roger Berkowitz, “Bearing Logs on Our 
Shoulders: Reconciliation, Non-Reconciliation, and the Building of a Common World”, Theory & 
Event 14.1 (2011); Roger Berkowitz, “The Angry Jew Has Gotten His Revenge”: Hannah Arendt on 
Revenge and Reconciliation”, Philosophical Topics 39.2 (2011); Shai Lavi, “Crimes of Action, Crimes 
of Thought: Arendt on Reconciliation, Forgiveness, and Judgment”, in Thinking in Dark Times: 
Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics, eds., Roger Berkowitz, Thomas Keenan and Jeffrey Katz (New 
York, 2009); Daniel and Birgit Maier-Katkin, “Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger: Calumny and 
the Politics of Reconciliation”, Human Rights Quarterly 28.1 (2006): 86-119; Andrew Schaap, “Guilty 
Subjects and Political Responsibility: Arendt, Jaspers and the Resonance of the ‘German Question’ in 
Politics of Reconciliation”, Political Studies 49.4 (2001): 749-66. 
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she attributed to contemporary social scientific analyses – prevented a confrontation 
of the ‘elements’ of totalitarianism in Western society. Something akin to a Hegelian 
mode of reconciliation to the world, discerning hermeneutic value in even the most 
appalling of events, might lead to a productive understanding of the past. But it might 
also create a fatalistic resignation in the face of historical events, or worse, support the 
Marxist view that past violence was the necessary ‘midwife of history’.10 Two 
commitments were required to supplant Hegelian and Marxist responses to the past: 
firstly, to abandon a view of history as possessing rationality. To prevent this leading 
to a nihilistic politics of will or abandonment of oneself to the flow of history required 
a second commitment, to judging the past. This tied a concept of reconciliation to that 
of non-reconciliation. 
Constructed at a time when she still felt totalitarianism to be an immediate threat, 
Arendt’s notion of non-reconciliation was a blunt precursor to her theory of judgment. 
Non-reconciliation entailed a refusal of political arrangements founded on violence 
and a starting point for political action. It also conflicted with the need for 
reconciliation. Because Arendt viewed modern history and politics as overwhelmingly 
characterised by violence, the notion of non-reconciliation encouraged her to lay out 
extremely demanding sets of conditions for political legitimacy. This would feed into 
her ultimately implausible account of the quasi-contractual conditions for legitimate 
polities in On Revolution (1963). Many of the paradoxes of Arendt’s later political 
thought stemmed from this relationship between violence and history. 
 This essay reinterprets several major aspects of Arendt's trajectory in the years 
following the publication of Origins in 1951. Though there have been numerous 
scholarly treatments of her historical thought as a form of ‘storytelling’, they have 
neglected the philosophical and anthropological justifications she provided for her 
historical approach.11 This essay examines these justifications in three ways. First, it 
                                                
10 Hannah Arendt, “Understanding and Politics”, in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, 
Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 2005), 287. 
11 Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott, “Storytelling”, History and Theory 50.2 (2011): 203-09; George Cotkin, 
“Illuminating Evil: Hannah Arendt and Moral History”, Modern Intellectual History 4.3 (2007): 463-
90; Lynn R Wilkinson, “Hannah Arendt on Isak Dinesen: Between Storytelling and Theory”, 
Comparative Literature 56.1 (2004): 77-98; Lisa J Disch, “More Truth Than Fact: Storytelling as 
Critical Understanding in the Writings of Hannah Arendt”, Political Theory 21.4 (1993): 665-94; Seyla 
Benhabib, “Hannah Arendt and the Redemptive Power of Narrative”, Social Research 57.1 (1990): 
167-96; Ned Curthoys, “Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Narrative”, Journal of Narrative Theory 32, 
3 (2002): 348-70; Kai Evers, “The Holes of Oblivion: Arendt and Benjamin on Storytelling in the Age 
of Totalitarian Destruction”, Telos 132 (2005): 109-20; Annabel Herzog, “Illuminating Inheritance: 
Benjamin’s Influence on Arendt’s Political Storytelling”, Philosophy & Social Criticism 26.5 (2000): 
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examines the historical dimensions of her writings on imperialism and totalitarianism, 
showing that her critique of instrumental conceptions of politics emerged from a 
critique of historically-grounded justifications of violence. 
Second, it shows that though Marx was an important figure in Arendt's intellectual 
development in the early 1950s, he was a starting point for a number of concerns, 
rather than her sole interest. Uninterested in producing a straightforward anti-
totalitarian take on Marx, she used parts of his political economy to ground her 
depiction of the rise of ‘mass’ societies. Such societies, she argued, fostered alienated 
and instrumental attitudes towards the world, and a search for meaning through the 
direction of historical change. This led to politics based on practices of violent 
domination and legitimised with reference to the course of history. Her reading was 
shaped by French thinkers such as Alexandre Kojève, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty.12 Connecting these concerns to her critique of the nihilism of French 
existentialism and the relationship between violence and history in Marxism shows 
how sustained these reflections were, casting light on the transition from her earlier 
work to later criticisms of Sartre and Frantz Fanon in On Violence (1970), and her 
condemnation of the Vietnam War.13 
Third, this essay shows that by 1954, Arendt had developed a positive notion of 
historical understanding, defined against Hegelian reconciliation to the past. A central 
foil for this, as with her examination of violence, was French existentialist thought – 
specifically that of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty – which she felt failed to grasp the 
unprecedented historical situation. Against their purported combination of 
voluntarism and fatalism, she sought a means of interpreting the past that was 
reconciled to the impossibility of political action reliably realising its original 
intentions, but avoided nihilistic resignation to violent conflict.  
Examining these three themes sheds light on the postwar intersection between 
German and French thought on history and violence, and revises interpretations of 
                                                                                                                                       
1-27; Lynn R Wilkinson, “Hannah Arendt on Isak Dinesen: Between Storytelling and Theory”, 
Comparative Literature 56.1 (2004): 77-98. 
12 For a rare discussion of Arendt in a French context see Jeffrey C Isaac, Arendt, Camus and Modern 
Rebellion (London, 1992), 82-83; Another exception to this is Ned Curthoys’s discussion of Arendt’s 
critique of violence in the context of debates among French intellectuals about the French-Algerian 
war. See Ned Curthoys, “The Refractory Legacy of Algerian Decolonization: Revisiting Arendt on 
Violence”, in Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide, ed. 
Richard H King and Dan Stone (Oxford, 2007). 
13 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York, 1970); Hannah Arendt, “Home to Roost”, in Responsibility 
and Judgment (New York, 2009); Owens, Between War and Politics, 150. 
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Arendt as a historical thinker. It also points to the origins of her later theory of 
judgment. This essay begins by considering Arendt’s writings on imperialism and 
totalitarianism and critique of French existentialism. It then turns to her articulation of 
reconciliation and non-reconciliation as ways with which to comprehend the past with 
an eye to responsible political action, before showing how this approach inflected her 
investigations of labour, history and – crucially – violence. 
II. IMPERIALISM, NIHILISM AND HISTORY 
A history of modernity and critique of violence as much as an investigation of 
Marxism, “Totalitarian Elements of Marxism” possessed significant continuities with 
Arendt's earlier work. In particular, the account of race-imperialism that came to form 
a central part of Origins shows that from an early stage she saw violence as a central 
“subterranean” element of Western history.14 Imperial expansion tied to racial 
domination, Arendt argued, had undermined the European nation-state by radicalising 
tensions between the state as impartial guarantor of rights, and the nation as ethnic 
community.15 Competition for scarce colonial outlets for capital generated conflict, 
leading to the collapse of the international state-system in war.16 As nation-states 
collapsed, totalitarian movements exploited the political vacuum, drawing on violent 
practices of racial domination developed in the colonies.17 This was her “boomerang 
thesis” – based on a reading of liberal J.H. Hobson – of the effects of colonialism on 
the legal and political structures of European states.18 Theories of ethnic supremacy 
justifying colonialism abroad undermined the concept of an impartial state at home. 
Despite debts to Rudolf Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin in describing the 
connections between capital accumulation, overseas expansion and war, Arendt's 
                                                
14 Even in late 1947, Arendt still referred to Origins as “her imperialism book”. Hannah Arendt to Karl 
Jaspers, 4 Sept. 1947, Lotte Köhler and Hans Saner (eds.) Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers: 
Correspondence: 1926-1969, trans. Rita and Robert Kimber (New York, 1992), 96-99; Elisabeth 
Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (London, 1983), 203; Arendt used the term 
“subterranean” in the preface to the first edition of Origins. See Arendt, Origins, ix. 
15 Hannah Arendt, “Race-Thinking Before Racism”, The Review of Politics 6.1 (1944), 36-73; Hannah 
Arendt, “Power Politics Triumphs”, in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and 
Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 2005); Hannah Arendt, “Imperialism, Nationalism, 
Chauvinism”, Review of Politics 7.4 (1945), 441-63; Hannah Arendt, “Expansion and the Philosophy 
of Power”, The Sewanee Review (1946), 601-16; Arendt, Origins, 267-302. 
16 Arendt, “Imperialism, Nationalism, Chauvinism”, 450; Arendt, “Expansion and the Philosophy of 
Power” 604-16. 
17 Arendt, “Imperialism, Nationalism, Chauvinism”, 441-42. 
18 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, trans. E.B. Ashton 3rd edn. (London, 1967), 328; 
Ibid. 124, 126, 135; Mantena, “Genealogies of Catastrophe: Arendt on the Logic and Legacy of 
Imperialism”. 
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analysis lay well outside the paradigm of early twentieth-century Marxism, providing 
little detailed economic explanation of the influence of colonialism on European 
genocide.19 She was engaging in cultural criticism as much as history. For example, in 
her 1946 article “Imperialism and Suicide”, she argued that the force behind European 
power-politics and imperialism lay in a scientific materialism that found man’s origin 
in “Nothingness…in spiritually void matter”, and therefore “looked toward the 
annihilation of man”. Although driving the lust for power and possession, nihilism 
also catalysed the fulfillment of these desires in destruction, “the most radical form of 
domination as well as possession”.20  
Arendt's account of imperialism, while avowedly anti-colonial, was strongly 
Eurocentric, with implications for the inclusiveness of her understanding of history.21 
She clearly possessed many of the prejudices of her contemporaries.22 In Origins she 
described sub-Saharan Africans as “without a culture or history of their own” for 
failing to erect a “human artifice” atop the natural world.23 The silence of indigenous 
peoples in her narrative of imperialism is compounded by empathetic descriptions of 
the experiences of European settlers and adventurers, who, when they killed, they 
were “not aware they had committed murder”.24 Her Eurocentric cultural 
anthropology points to an uneasy early relationship to Hegel. Despite her claim in 
Origins that he was “never interested in the rise and fall of cultures as such or in any 
law which would explain the death of nations”, Hegel did in fact pronounce judgment 
on peoples such as the North American Indians, and advocated colonisation to bring 
                                                
19 Arendt, Origins, 148-9, 168, 308; Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of 
Capitalist Development, ed. T. B. Bottomore trans. Morris Watnick and Sam Gordon (London, 1910); 
Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (London, 1913); Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Imperialism: 
The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York, 1916); For a discussion of Arendt’s debts to other 
thinkers in Origins see Alfons Söllner, “Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism in its original 
context”, European Journal of Political Theory 3.2 (2004), 230-35; While adopting its general tenor in 
Origins, Arendt in fact took little interest in the details of the Marxist analysis of imperialism. See Roy 
T Tsao, “The Three Phases of Arendt’s Theory of Totalitarianism”, Social Research 69.2 (2002), 583. 
20 Hannah Arendt, “Imperialism: Road to Suicide”, Commentary 1 (1946), 33. 
21 See, for example Tony Barta, “On Pain of Extinction: Laws of Nature and History in Darwin, Marx, 
and Arendt”, in Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide, ed. 
Richard H King and Dan Stone (Oxford, 2007) 87-108; Robert Bernasconi, “When the Real Crime 
Began: Hannah Arendt’s the Origins of Totalitarianism and the Dignity of the Western Philosophical 
Tradition”, in Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History, ed. King and Stone, 54-67; Mantena, 
“Genealogies of Catastrophe: Arendt on the Logic and Legacy of Imperialism”. 
22 Richard H King, “On Race and Culture: Hannah Arendt and Her Contemporaries”, in Politics in 
Dark Times: Encounters With Hannah Arendt, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge, 2010), 116. 
23 Arendt, Origins, 186, 300. 
24 Ibid., 192. 
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Oriental peoples into the stream of real history.25 Though plausibly ignorant of these 
views, Arendt’s analysis similarly implied the exclusion of peoples from history on 
the grounds of their purported inability to humanise the world; in her case through 
establishing laws, polities or written records of deeds.26 This was a spatially and 
temporally understood differentiation between humanist and quasi-natural 
relationships to the world that would shape her later distinction between work and 
labour.  
Despite condemning imperialism more for its effects on Europe rather than the 
non-European world, Arendt rejected the idea that the barbarism of totalitarian rule 
was only an import from colonial encounters. The bureaucratised violence of colonial 
practices was a product of a nihilism that unfolded from the heart of Western 
thought.27 By the end of 1946, she had dropped the idea of violence as an immediate 
relation between consciousness and the world, as described in “Imperialism and 
Suicide”. Instead she explained the violence of colonialism and then totalitarianism 
through historical and social conditions, ideology and philosophy.28 She still saw 
mass violence at the heart of modern history, but with the shift from colonial 
domination to European genocide its attachment to a wide set of bureaucratic 
practices became contingent on a wide range of factors. The ‘suicidal’ dimensions of 
nihilism were subsumed in a description of the passive masses swept up in totalitarian 
movements.29 Arendt retained the general category of nihilism to characterise the 
destructive tendencies at the core of European thought, tied to modern ways of seeing 
history in terms of a blend of fatalism and voluntaristic freedom.30 Its surfacing into 
                                                
25 Ibid., 171; For a detailed discussion of race and imperialism in Hegel’s thought, see Robert 
Bernasconi, “With What Must the Philosophy of World History Begin? On the Racial Basis of Hegel’s 
Eurocentrism”, Nineteenth Century Contexts 22.2 (2000), 190. 
26 Arendt, Human Condition, 139-44; For a discussion of these themes, see Owens, Between War and 
Politics, 135-36; Kenneth Frampton, “The Status of Man and the Status of His Objects: A Reading of 
the Human Condition”, in Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, ed. Melvyn A. Hill 
(New York, 1979).  
27 For discussions of Arendt’s notion of barbarism, see Canovan, A Reinterpretation, 22, 32-38, 102-
110. 
28 See for example Hannah Arendt, “The Image of Hell”, in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: 
Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 2005), 203-04. 
29 Arendt’s change of emphasis was indicative of a background of radical appropriations of mass 
society discourse. Émigré contemporaries such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Erich 
Fromm were making similar claims about the roots of fascism during the same period. See Theodor W 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Philosophische Fragmente (New York, 1944); Max Horkheimer, 
Eclipse of Reason (Oxford, 1947); Erich Fromm, The Fear of Freedom (London, 1942);  In 1936 in 
Paris she had joined a discussion group of intellectuals associated with the Frankfurt School. See 
Marrus, “Hannah Arendt and the Dreyfus Affair”, 148. 
30 For an exploration of this theme, see Canovan, A Reinterpretation, 11-14. 
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the mainstream of Western history marked a radical break with history. The 
philosophical basis for this treatment can be discerned in her early criticisms of 
French existential thought. 
III. NIHILISM AND EXISTENTIALISM 
French existentialism, Arendt opined, was a “rebellion of the intellectuals” hostile 
to bourgeois society and committed to a notion of freedom not bound to historical 
forces.31 In a 1946 piece she commended Sartre’s lecture “Existentialism is a 
Humanism”, delivered in 1945, for rejecting both the “sterility of the old 
revolutionary elite” and the “spiritual bankruptcy of the left”. Alluding to attempts to 
clear a political and intellectual space between the Socialist Party (SFIO) and the 
French Communist Party (PCF), she was also praising Sartre’s humanistic rejection of 
materialism and emphasis on the contingency of existence.32 Nevertheless, she 
suggested that his “new humanism” was a reinvigorated nihilism.33 Her usage of 
‘nihilism’ in this instance followed Heidegger’s emphasis on the obscuring of Being 
by the stress placed on individual beings in Western metaphysics. Heidegger saw 
Descartes’s dualism as exemplary of this forgetting, in its strict division of 
subjectivity from world and consequent treatment of man and his surroundings 
through the prism of self-consciousness.34 In his play The Flies (1944), she noted, 
                                                
31 Hannah Arendt, “French Existentialism”, in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, 
and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 2005) 192-93; Arendt viewed bourgeois society as 
partly responsible for the rise of totalitarianism. One reviewer of Origins commented that “For Miss 
Arendt, it is the bourgeoisie, as a class…that has become radically evil…” Philip Rieff, “The Theology 
of Politics: Reflections on Totalitarianism as the Burden of Our Time (a Review Article)”, The Journal 
of Religion 32.2 (1952), 119; Arendt had met Sartre in New York in 1945, having already crossed paths 
with him in Paris during the 1930s. Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, 117. 
32 Arendt, “French Existentialism”, 192-3, 188-9; Her attitude reflected a conviction that continental 
political parties had proved impotent in the face of fascism. See Arendt, Origins, 89-120, 261-3; For 
more on the political context for “Existentialism is a Humanism” see Edward Baring, “Humanist 
Pretensions: Catholics, Communists, and Sartre’s Struggle for Existentialism in Postwar France”, 
Modern Intellectual History 7.3 (2010), 581-609. 
33 A chapter from Nausea appeared in the same issue of Partisan Review in which Arendt’s piece was 
published, under the title "The Root of the Chestnut Tree”. Arendt, “French Existentialism”, 189; In his 
lecture, Sartre had rejected materialisms that led “one to treat every man including oneself…as a set of 
pre-determined reactions”. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, ed. Philip Mairet trans. 
Philip Mairet (London, 1948), 45. 
34 Heidegger’s most influential discussion of nihilism was presented in his lectures on Nietzsche from 
the 1930s. However, Arendt’s critical discussion of “nihilation” and Being as nothingness in “What is 
Existential Philosophy?” in 1946 suggests his inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg “What is 
Metaphysics”, which she would have had easier access to, was more prominent in her mind. Martin 
Heidegger, Nietzsche: Nihilism, ed. David Farrell Krell trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (London, 1982) IV; 
Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?”, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge, 1998), 
82-96; Heidegger, Nietzsche: Nihilism, 97; Michael Allen Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground 
of History (Chicago, 1984), xiv-xv, 20; Bogdan Costea and Kostas Amiridis, “The Movement of 
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Sartre proposed that “if man becomes aware of his own consciousness…he realises 
that he depends upon nothing and nobody outside himself”.35 The suggestion was that 
by conflating existence with subjective consciousness, Sartrean existentialism entailed 
a nihilistic relationship to others and a hubristic account of human capacities.36 
The appeal of this form of nihilism in France, Arendt believed, was a reaction to 
the spread of devoluntarising philosophies of history. In “What is Existential 
Philosophy?” (1946) the same year as her review of French existentialism, she argued 
that radical and nihilistic accounts of human freedom were best understood as 
responses to the determinism of modern historical consciousness.37 Her argument 
rested on a compressed history of alienation and historicism in post-Kantian German 
thought. The problem of historicism, she claimed, emerged in the nineteenth century 
alongside the increasing influence of the natural sciences on the humanities, leading 
to the underplaying of human agency through definitions of human agency in terms of 
the “historical or natural or biological or psychological flow in which he [man] was 
caught up”.38 During the same period, she argued,  the notion of alienation emerged as 
a philosophical problem, rooted in the Kantian split between the noumenal realm of 
rational freedom and the phenomenal world of causal determinism. In nineteenth-
century philosophy this led to attempts to overcome alienation and determinism in the 
name of human freedom. Increasingly radical anthropocentric idealisms and 
materialisms – such as that of Marx – masked the persistence of “an open or hidden 
concept of fate” combined with an “element of defiance”.39  
                                                                                                                                       
Nihilism as Self-Assertion”, in The Movement of Nihilism: Heidegger’s Thinking After Nietzsche, ed. 
Laurence Paul Hemming and Kostas Amiridis and Bogdan Costea (London, 2011), 14-16. 
35 Arendt, “French Existentialism”, 193. 
36 This was also an implication of Heidegger’s critical response to Sartre, first published in France in 
early 1947. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San 
Francisco, 1993); See Anson Rabinbach, “Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ as Text and Event”, in In 
the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals Between Apocalypse and Enlightenment, ed. Anson 
Rabinbach (New York, 1995), 97-129; Ethan Kleinberg, Generation Existential: Heidegger’s 
Philosophy in France, 1927-1961 (Ithaca, NY, 2005), 11-12; Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the 
Ground of History, 124-25. 
37 Hannah Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy?”, in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: 
Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 2005).  
38 Ibid., 166; In Origins Arendt stated that “organic naturalistic definitions of peoples” were an 
“outstanding characteristic” of German historicism. Arendt, Origins, 166; Arendt did not use 
“historicism” to refer only the institutionalised German academic discourses normally associated with 
the term – she collected Hegel and theorists of decline such as Oswald Spengler under the rubric – her 
usage fits into a pattern of misappropriations by émigrés in the 1940s seeking to explain Nazism and 
Stalinism, Karl Popper being the most prominent example. See Karl R Popper, The Open Society and 
Its Enemies: Vol I - the Spell of Plato, 1st edn. (London, 1945) I. 
39 Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy?”, 171. 
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Early phenomenology, Arendt claimed, sought to circumvent this choice between 
freedom and necessity by reconstituting the world through human consciousness.40 
This entailed treating man as a “world-creating being”, capable of constructing a 
totalising philosophical system that would end alienation. By conferring divine status 
on humanity, this endeavour both failed to recognise its historical conditions – 
secularisation – and remained trapped in a Cartesianism it had intended to surpass.41 
Though Heidegger's drew attention to the impossibility of this project, in the process 
he produced a radical nihilism by placing nothingness at the heart of Being to create a 
“world-destroying being”.42 Arendt maintained that despite his claims to have 
effected a destruction of Western metaphysics, Heidegger was still beholden to 
Cartesian ontology that posited a rigid divide between consciousness and supposedly 
external phenomena. Her narrative of philosophical change had a sharp political point. 
While avoiding denigrating existentialism entirely, Arendt sought to criticise the 
irresponsibility of Heidegger’s thought, and its adaptation by Sartre, spurred on by 
additional information about Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism, Arendt sought to 
criticise the irresponsibility of his thought.43 Cartesian ontology, reflecting a wider 
metaphysics of modernity, tended to separate being from a wholly externalised, fallen 
and alienated world, leading to an unworldly and instrumental attitude to politics. 
Given his conviction that public speech was idle chatter and political life 
irredeemable, it was unsurprising, she argued, that Heidegger’s radicalisation of this 
tendency led him to the destructive panacea of National Socialism.44 This nihilistic 
combination of Cartesianism, phenomenology and existentialism, she suggested, was 
being radicalised by Sartre and other French thinkers.45 
                                                
40 Husserl was the key figure she referred to. Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy?”, 165; For an 
excellent survey of Husserl and early phenomenology, see Dermot Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder 
of Phenomenology (2005). 
41 Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy?”, 166; For more on the issue of secularisation in Arendt’s 
thought, see Samuel Moyn, “Hannah Arendt on the Secular”, New German Critique 35.3 (2008), 71-
96; Elizabeth Brient, “Hans Blumenberg and Hannah Arendt on the “Unworldly Worldliness” of the 
Modern Age”, Journal of the History of Ideas 61.3 (2000), 513-30. 
42 Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy?”, 177. 
43 Ibid. n.2, 187.; Arendt  praised Karl Jaspers’s existential theory of “communication” as an alternative 
to Heidegger’s philosophy, ibid., 174. 
44 Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy?”, n2, 187. 
45 Arendt was referring to Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943). Sartre had used Henri Corbin’s 
translations of Heidegger, which translated Heidegger’s Dasein in somewhat anthropocentric and 
individualist terms as réalité-humaine Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on 
Phenomenological Ontology, ed. M. Warnock trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London, 1943); See Kleinberg, 
Generation Existential, 124, 70, 112-14; Stefanos Geroulanos, An Atheism That is Not Humanist 
Emerges in French Thought (Stanford, CA, 2010), 53; Rabinbach, “Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ 
as Text and Event”. 
11 
 
The existentialist model of freedom opposed to historically-imposed necessity 
generated conceptions of politics and the past that placed violence at the heart of 
historical change, as the only means of breaking with the dead weight of the past or 
the mediocrity of mass society. This violent relationship between freedom and 
necessity, Arendt suggested, was characteristic of philosophical modernity.46 In 
Origins she tied this historical understanding to totalitarian ideologies: comprehensive 
Spenglerian or dialectical materialist notions of history had fuelled the fatalistic and 
relentless activism of the ‘front generation’.47 Against these approaches, she argued 
that responsible political action would require combining sensitivity to history with 
discrimination. After completing the manuscript for Origins in 1949, she began to 
grapple with ways of approaching the past that were attuned to the need for 
understanding as well as responsible political engagement. Arising from an attempt to 
come to terms with Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, her notion of 
reconciliation brought personal, political and philosophical concerns to bear on 
historical understanding. 
IV. RECONCILIATION AND UNDERSTANDING  
The occasion for Arendt’s development of ideas of reconciliation and non-
reconciliation as a means of judging the past was a discussion of forgiveness with 
with Heidegger, following their rapprochement after a visit she paid to him in 
February 1950, while working for the Committee for Jewish Reconstruction in 
Europe. Their ensuing correspondence prompted her to reflect on the themes of 
forgiveness, revenge, and reconciliation. Writing to her in May, Heidegger had 
referred to Nietzsche’s thoughts from Also Sprach Zarathustra on the desire for 
revenge and the difficulty of reconciliation.48 In a long note written in June 1950 – the 
first entry of her Denktagebuch, a notebook she would maintain until 1973 – Arendt 
opposed reconciliation to both forgiveness and revenge, articulating a notion of 
judgment oriented towards the past.49 Forgiveness, she claimed, placed the judge so 
far above the object or person being forgiven that it meant “no further relationship” 
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was possible. It was only possible for God. She could not, therefore, ease Heidegger’s 
burden of guilt by forgiving him. Revenge, however, was also inappropriate, as it 
equated judge and wrongdoer. Reconciliation, however, generated a form of solidarity 
resting on an acceptance of wrongs as a feature of the world, without erasing their 
historical occurrence through forgiveness or justifying degrading acts of revenge. 
Arendt saw this notion of reconciliation – originally conceived to encapsulate her 
feelings about Heidegger – as suitable for affirming plurality, or human difference 
and unity, in the wake of catastrophe. Simultaneously past and future-oriented, 
reconciliation could re-establish solidarity in the wake of an abhorrent act or event. It 
was therefore essential to the discriminating continuation, abandonment or 
reformation of joint political projects. Non-reconciliation, on the other hand, provided 
a response to acts that could be neither forgiven nor punished, or “about which one 
ought…to neither be silent about or pass by”, rejecting the conditions that gave rise to 
them, and demanding new circumstances.50 More so than forgiveness or revenge, the 
principles of reconciliation and non-reconciliation provided a reliable guide to judging 
the past. 
In a subsequent and rare methodological discussion, Arendt outlined a mode of 
historical cognition that could ground this idea of reconciliation. Her January 1953 
‘Reply’ to criticisms of her historical method made by philosopher Eric Voegelin was 
a significant step in her development of a notion of historical judgment. Her  
retrospective justification for the structure and approach she took in Origins, 
elucidated her demand for non-reconciliation to a world harbouring totalitarianism, 
suggesting how reconciliation and non-reconciliation might be applied to historical 
and political phenomena.51 Abhorrence of totalitarianism, she claimed, had led her to 
depart from scholarly conventions of neutrality in Origins, allowing the historical 
object to shape the relation between historian and object and cultivate a judgment.52 In 
describing “a methodological necessity closely connected with my particular subject 
matter”, she claimed, she was not merely emphasising the difficulty of neutrality 
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towards totalitarianism, but making a claim about the relationship between political 
judgment and historical analysis.53 Unreconciled to totalitarianism, she sought to 
disaggregate it into “elements” in order to destroy its conceptual unity.54  
While presenting her approach as without precedent, driven by the rupture with the 
past caused by totalitarianism, Arendt’s presentation of the role of the historical 
observer was clearly influenced by Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History”, the manuscript of which he had entrusted to her care before his suicide in 
1940.55 She argued for an erosion of the separation between historian and historical 
object, a distinction that she claimed suppressed the stakes of historical investigation. 
The aim was not for “a history of totalitarianism” but rather “an analysis in terms of 
history”, employing the “imagination consciously as tool of cognition”.56 This was an 
echo of Benjamin’s demand that the historical materialist “blast a specific era out of 
the homogenous course of history”.57  
Arendt's claims about imagination and cognition pointed to her respect for the 
mode of imaginative identification with historical objects found in German  
historiography.58 But by noting that “mere observation of chronological order”, was 
“necessarily salvation and frequently justification”, she was repeating Benjamin’s 
criticisms of the quasi-theological grounds of German historicism, which he argued 
depicted “the sequence of events like the beads or a rosary”.59 Historicism did not 
interpret the distinctiveness of particular events and their significance for the present; 
this was a claim she had previously made about Hegel’s attitude towards the past.60 
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Contemporary historicism, she suggested, viewed the emergence of totalitarianism 
in terms of “intellectual affinities and influences”.61 This hinted at the approaches of 
contemporaries Jacob Talmon and Karl Popper, but also to Voegelin’s own reading of 
totalitarianism.62 In contrast, the role of the historian, Arendt implied, was to observe 
disparate strands and historical objects and assemble them into something resembling 
what Benjamin referred to as “the constellation which his own era has formed with a 
definite earlier one”.63 In Origins she had assembled the elements that were to 
“crystallize into totalitarianism”.64 Such an approach required judgment grounded by 
either reconciliation or non-reconciliation.  
The tentative claims Arendt presented in her reply to Voegelin did not, however, 
constitute a methodology. She hinted at a more systematic frame for historical 
investigations in “Understanding and Politics” (1954). There she defined 
understanding as the means by which “we come to terms with and reconcile ourselves 
to reality, that is, try to be at home in the world”. Distinct from “correct information 
and scientific knowledge”, it grounded political judgment, rooted in the reconciliation 
or non-reconciliation of historical objects.65 While “understanding” defined the 
relation of the historian to the historical object, “events”, delimited the character of 
phenomena to be studied. Congealed clusters of speech and action, events were 
manifestations of intersubjective human freedom. Without their disruptions, history 
was merely “the dead monotony of sameness, unfolded in time”. Events could not be 
explained by causal historical analysis or subsumed into wider historical processes, as 
they transcended “the sum total of all willed intentions and the significance of all 
origins”.66 The influence of Benjamin was again evident here; in her description of the 
“dead monotony” of history understood as a chain of causal sequences, Arendt echoed 
his criticisms of conceptions of history as the site of “homogenous, empty time” 
rather than time filled by “the presence of the now”.67 She was articulating an 
avowedly present-oriented relationship to the past. Her conceptualisation of “events” 
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also resembled Benjamin’s claim about the historical materialist approaching “a 
historical subject only where he encounters it as a monad”.68  
While the description provided of the historical gaze drew on Benjamin, Arendt's 
argument rested on a more clearly non-Marxist basis, attuned to a notion of 
reconciliation as a form of judgment.69 Seeing the past in terms of “events” was a 
prophylactic against the alienation fostered by the meaningless temporality prevalent 
in mass societies, but it was also a goad to political judgment and action, bounded by 
reconciliation to certain objects, and non-reconciliation to others. The chief example 
of an event she used was that of totalitarian domination.70 Such an event could not be 
assimilated into the flow of historical processes that integrated it into some higher 
meaning; it made prevalent forms of historical-political understanding seem obsolete. 
It also signified a moment of non-reconciliation. This notion of the ‘event’ was a 
rebuke to Hegel’s form of universal reconciliation and to Marx’s conception of 
history as the development of the labouring process. Both denuded history of meaning 
and undermined its value as a ground for action, and for an understanding that would 
allow one to become “at home in the world”, rather than condemned to the 
“rootlessness” that totalitarianism had preyed upon. Arendt worked out the substance 
of these criticisms in “Totalitarian Elements of Marxism”, an important stage in her 
treatment of the relationship between history, violence and action. 
V. CRITIQUING MARX 
 Arendt began work in earnest on “Totalitarian Elements of Marxism” around 
the same time as she began to think about the notion of reconciliation. Marx, whom 
she read above all as providing a philosophy of history that legitimated violent 
transformation, was a vital foil to her views on the proper relationship between 
political thought and history. Yet though planned as an exploration of the Marxist 
road to Stalinist totalitarianism, “Totalitarian Elements of Marxism” was originally 
also intended to be a reconciliation of sorts, in order to benefit from Marx’s insights 
into modern history. This entailed re-appropriating of his thought from anti-Stalinist 
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intellectuals.71 Looking for trans-Atlantic and European intellectual solidarity in the 
late 1940s, she had become disenchanted with the bellicosity of American anti-
Stalinism.72 It was in this context that she announced to her friend and erstwhile 
mentor Karl Jaspers that she intended to study Marx, at a time when “every little idiot 
thinks he has a right and a duty to look down” on him.73 Even as late as 1952, Arendt 
remained more sympathetic than many of her émigré contemporaries, writing that 
Marxism had “done as much to hide and obliterate the actual teachings of Marx as it 
has to propagate them”.74  
 Marx, Arendt argued, was vital to understanding modern history, not only as the 
progenitor of a radical intellectual tradition that had been used to legitimise Soviet 
totalitarianism, but also as an acute observer of the rise of labour as a political force.75 
Lecturing on totalitarianism in universities across Europe after the publication of 
Origins in March 1951, she had the opportunity to delve into Parisian archives on the 
history of the labour and socialist movements. Following another trip to Paris in 1952, 
she prepared a series of lectures on “Karl Marx and the Tradition of Western Political 
Thought” delivered at Princeton in 1953.76 These lectures indicate that she had begun 
to use Marx’s political economy to clarify her views of the global developments that 
had led to totalitarianism. In Origins she had described the masses uprooted from 
class interests, breaking with class analyses, while retaining a Marxist emphasis on 
imperialism.77 Now she extended her narrative chronologically and thematically with 
the aid of his account of primitive accumulation from the first volume of Capital, 
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combining his accounts of Reformation-era expropriations of communal land and the 
Industrial Revolution to explain the emergence of ‘mass societies’ dependent on 
economic growth at the expense of the public spheres required to support political 
life. 78 
Arendt’s interest was less in Marx’s political economy, however, than in his 
philosophy of history, against which she began to define her own mode of historical 
understanding. While respecting his acumen as a critic of capitalism, she argued that 
he possessed a deterministic conception of history modelled on the activity of labour 
itself. The future emancipation of labour would allow the mastery of nature to 
produce ‘the truly human world on earth’.79 But labour, Arendt argued, was the most 
repetitive and ultimately meaningless of human activities. By cheering the ‘gigantic 
multiplication of needs, the fulfilment of which is felt to belong to the necessities of 
life’, Marx inadvertently urged on the development of the stultifying mass societies 
described in Origins, now redefined in terms of nihilistic and ‘worldless’ devotion to 
labouring and consuming.80 Arendt’s view of Marx’s notion of labour as biologised 
was not a freestanding phenomenological analysis, but reflected the influence of 
postwar French readings that imputed Hegelian and phenomenological categories to 
Marx’s thought.81 
In the late 1940s, a focus on alienation and the revolutionary humanising of the 
world in Marx’s thought had become central to a humanist form of Marxism directed 
against crude forms of dialectical materialism associated with Stalinism.82 Merleau-
Ponty, for example, wrote in Humanism and Terror (1947) that “it has been remarked 
without paradox that Capital is a concrete Phenomenology of Mind, that is to say, that 
it is inseparably concerned with the working of the economy and the realization of 
man”.83 The “whole import of Marxist politics”, he argued, could not be understood 
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without “going back to Hegel’s description of the fundamental relations between 
men”.84 Arendt’s approach at the beginning of “Totalitarian Elements of Marxism” 
was similar. In February 1951, before her studies of labour in Paris, she still viewed 
Marx in a primarily humanist vein; justifying her plans to a sceptical Jaspers, she 
pointed to his early article “Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood”, and its rebellion 
against the “abstraction of society” and the “de-humanizing of man and the de-
naturizing of nature” by the ‘economy of commodities”.85 By the end of the year, 
however, she had moderated this emphasis on Marx’s humanism. Invoking a 
phenomenological contrast bolstered by readings in Parisian archives on labour and 
socialism, she claimed in her Guggenheim application that he conflated humanising 
work – associated with craft and artistry – with labour, a repetitive, dehumanising 
interaction with nature geared towards the reproduction of life.86 
Arendt’s critique of Marx’s philosophy of history relied on a strong distinction 
between labour and work. Yet as critics have pointed out, Marx did not draw such a 
strong distinction between the two activities. Instead, following Hegel, he emphasised 
their dialectical relation, ascribing humanising potential to labour in ways that Arendt 
seemed to wilfully ignore.87 Making her case for the separation of labour and work, 
she drew on Engels, Darwin, and her own phenomenological interpretation, stressing 
the similarity between Marx’s view of labour and natural scientific history.88 Her 
combination of the Hegelian and humanist Marx of the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts with the purportedly economistic one of Capital brought together early 
and late writings at a time when other commentators were beginning to stress their 
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difference.89 Arendt suggested that neither a simply humanist, nor a simply 
determinist interpretation of Marx was possible, because he persistently combined the 
necessity of labour with the radical freedom to remake the world through humanising 
work. It is notable that she would acknowledge in The Human Condition (1958) that 
there was little textual basis in his writings for her distinction.90 She held on to her 
questionable distinction between labour and work in order to present Marx as the 
culmination of a modern tendency to see human existence in terms of a radical 
opposition between necessity and freedom. This was the metaphysical relationship 
she had criticised in “What is Existential Philosophy?”. 
In his conception of the past, Arendt argued, Marx granted history meaning only 
through a “single gigantic development process” that reduced it to data read off the 
historical ledger. This flattened interpretative complexity and prevented the past from 
becoming a source of understanding that would allow reconciliation to the world.91 
Worse, in treating violence as “the midwife of history”, he furnished the basis for 
doctrines of dialectical materialism that legitimated violence as a tool for escaping 
from historical necessity to the realm of freedom, reaching a nadir with the Stalinist 
belief that terror would speed historical progress.92 Marx’s form of historical 
understanding, Arendt claimed, encouraged not only an indiscriminate reconciliation 
to the past, but specifically to its violence, thus inhibiting the exercise of political 
judgment essential to a proper form of reconciliation that could make individuals at 
home in the world. This interpretation is best understood alongside her view of 
contemporary French thought. 
VI. WORK, VIOLENCE AND HISTORY 
Postwar French thought suggested to Arendt that even existentialist approaches to 
Marxism advocated reconciliation to the purported necessity of violence. Her stays in 
Paris in 1951 and 1952 solidified her view of the renewed influence of Hegel and 
Marx amongst French intellectuals.93 Her criticisms were tempered, however, by 
respect for the political and philosophical attitude of French existentialism. She also 
remained unwilling to imply crude causal connections between Marxian ideas and 
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Soviet totalitarianism. Nevertheless, disillusioned with her intellectual acquaintances, 
by 1954 she was willing to criticise them openly. Opposition towards reconciliation to 
violence and the ‘progressive or doomed course of history’ became one of the foci of 
her tentative concept of historical understanding 94  
Like many European thinkers after the Second World War, Arendt found notions 
of the progressive direction of history deeply unpalatable. 95 Writing with a sense that 
traditional concepts of state and international relations were breaking down, she 
hoped for progress towards Kant’s vision of perpetual peace through a postwar 
European federation, but had no faith in history leading to a cosmopolitan endpoint.96 
She also entertained the possibility that an ‘end of history’ might succeed in bringing 
about mass societies devoid of a public realm, especially in light of Nazi and Soviet 
success in organising great masses of individuals along race or class lines. 97 She was 
deeply critical of non-pluralistic conceptions of groups, nations or worse, humanity, 
acting as collective subjects in history.98 
Arendt explored the intellectual and political origins of conceptions of historically-
developing humanity from the earliest stages of ‘Totalitarian Elements of Marxism’. 
Both Hegel and Marx, she claimed in September 1951, thought that humanity 
rationally revealed itself by shaping the world through work. Unlike Hegel, however, 
Marx suggested that work could be applied to shape the course of human history, 
humanising the world by bringing about the emancipation of labour.99 While Hegel 
had restricted his view of historical understanding to “what was comprehensible in 
purely contemplative terms”, Marx allowed conscious action to produce truth; 
Humanity could realise the Absolute – laws of history validated by dialectical 
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materialism – rather than relying on the cunning of History to do it behind their 
backs.100 Revolutionary change became the means by which the social organism of 
humanity could make history coincide with the development of productive forces.101 
Such a reading was hardly unprecedented. In his Paris seminars during the 1930s, 
Kojève had presented a teleological and anthropocentric Hegel, filtered through 
German phenomenology and Marxian political economy. Human existence in his 
scheme was rooted in time rather than space; in intentional becoming and conscious 
direction. Progress was driven by man’s mastery of nature, but also by a dialectic of 
struggles between masters and slaves, leading to a view of history as a series of 
violent conflicts directed towards a hopeful end.102 Kojève’s interpretation of 
historical change was taken up and radicalised by others. 
In Humanism and Terror, Merleau-Ponty had emphatically endorsed the Kojèvian 
association between violence and historical change.103 A former member of the 
Resistance and co-founder of influential journal Les Temps modernes with Sartre and 
Simone de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty discussed, through a discussion of the Moscow 
Trials of the 1930s, whether the use of violence and terror by the Soviet Union could 
be justified. The argument was complicated by the fact that it was now possible “to 
construct a picture of Soviet life which is the opposite of proletarian humanism”.104 
He concluded that violence and terror was justifiable if it brought history to an end 
and created “humanity”; a totality of non-exploitative relations between human 
beings. Denial of the need for violence was to be complicit with its institutionalisation 
in capitalist exploitation and imperialism, the practical manifestations of liberal 
humanism. Violence was already basic to politics, “the common origin of all 
regimes”.105 The question was not “to know whether one accepts or rejects violence”,  
but whether the form one allied with was progressive, tending “toward its own 
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suspension or toward self-perpetuation”.106 The basis of human life in relations of 
domination and struggles for recognition meant that history had to be understood in 
terms of violence, justified on the basis of its eventual cessation. History was, 
Merleau-Ponty argued in Kojèvian-Hegelian terms, “essentially a struggle – the 
struggle of the master and the slave, the struggle between classes”. This was, he 
claimed, “a necessity of the human condition”.107  
Arendt sought to undermine such understandings of history as a violent process 
amenable to conscious control. Perhaps the earliest expression of this endeavour was 
“Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government”, later turned into the final 
chapter of the second edition of Origins (1958).108 Delivered in its earliest form as a 
lecture entitled ‘Ideology and Propaganda’ at Notre Dame in 1950, the version 
published in The Review of Politics in 1953 downplayed the role of totalitarian 
propaganda, which she had stressed in the first edition of Origins, instead 
emphasising the power of ideologies: deductive, spuriously logical systems 
disconnected from reality, genuinely believed by their adherents.109 This was not the 
definition of ideology used by Marx or the Frankfurt School. The content of an 
ideology, she argued, was less important than the consistency of its argumentative 
structure.110 The political and theoretical gulf between her concept and that of 
Marxists was highlighted by her use of dialectical materialism as an exemplar of 
ideology, assimilating historical data according to a “stringent logicality” and 
justifying the use of terror to force the course of human history to fit it.111 
The model of totalitarian ideology that Arendt presented in her 1953 article 
contained a potted version of her interpretation of Marxian labour and work. The 
contentless core of ideologies was balanced by the work-like understanding of history 
they fostered. In driving attempts to mould the plural and unpredictable human world 
to fit teleological design, ideologies encouraged the escalation of violence. The 
Bolsheviks had thought it possible to make history and achieve a classless society 
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through conscious planning. But the experience of work – such as the making of a 
table necessarily involving the killing of a tree – could not be applied to unpredictable 
‘political activity, action, or historical events, or any other interaction between man 
and man’ without becoming destructive.112 She extended this claim to argue that 
categories of instrumentality applied to politics were inherently self-defeating, leading 
to means becoming ends. This was the form of self-negating nihilism she had 
critiqued in imperial expansion for the sake of expansion. Terror used to hasten the 
creation of Humanity simply resulted in more terror to whip recalcitrant individuals 
and groups into line, leading to the creation of new enemies to satisfy the ideal of 
continual transformation itself. The most brutal examples of the Sisyphean 
impossibility of applying instrumental standards of work to politics, she argued, were 
the anti-utilitarian frenzies of the Nazi genocide and the Soviet purges.113 Stalinist 
dialectical materialism was a parody of Marx’s historical teleology, combining the 
violence of work with the self-perpetuating character of labour.114 
This form of self-justifying violence was also present, Arendt argued, in 
legitimations of American foreign policy in terms of its historical destiny as leader of 
the free world. Attempts to turn democracy into a “cause” frequently entailed 
supporting “tyrannies and dictatorships, or misery and shameless exploitation of man 
by man, or the imperialist type of oppression of foreign peoples”.115 That such 
policies were often encouraged by ex-Communists suggested to her that modern 
approaches to history shared a particular ideological form.116 Though they had 
recanted their previous beliefs, they had not “lost their faith in History and its bloody 
and grandiose demands upon mankind”.117 In later criticisms of the Vietnam War, she 
would combine these criticisms with a reiteration of her “boomerang thesis” from 
Origins.118 Her arguments also lay in stark contrast to those presented by Merleau-
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Ponty, who had accepted violence in the hope that it would be self-limiting, 
guaranteed by reason in history, presupposing “in the present and in the flow of 
events a totality moving toward a privileged state which gives the whole its 
meaning”.119  
Arendt employed her critique of Marxian labour and work, forged in Paris but 
applied to American politics, to criticise the increasingly Hegelian and Marxist 
politics of the French existentialists. In the process, she returned to the treatment of 
nihilism, necessity and freedom from ‘What is Existential Philosophy?’. In Paris 
during the spring of 1952, she described to her husband how Sartre, the existential 
philosopher Eric Weil and others were “wrapped up in their theories”, living “in a 
world Hegelianly organized”.120 She had the opportunity to articulate these criticisms 
in a paper entitled “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical 
Thought”, which she presented at the September 1954 meeting of the American 
Political Science Association. She discussed European responses to totalitarianism, 
pointing especially to two strains of postwar French existentialism. 
 The first, represented by Camus and André Malraux, was committed to a 
limited revolt against social conditions, marked by an absence of “historical system or 
an elabourate definition of ends and means”.121 The second, exemplified by Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty, superimposed Marx as a “frame of reference” on a revolutionary 
commitment to action, even though “their original impulses owed hardly anything” to 
Marx.122 The stakes of this claim were rooted in the public dispute that unfolded in 
1952 between Sartre and Camus over The Rebel (1951), but reached back to the 
positions Merleau-Ponty had taken in Humanism and Terror. The apparently 
Manichean choice between global capitalism and communism that appeared to French 
intellectuals had led Sartre to support Communism as the lesser of two evils, and 
Camus to reject such a choice.123 Arendt's claim that there were two distinct strains of 
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French existentialism in “Concern with Politics” must be read in light of her support 
for Camus’s position.124 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty's turn to Marxism, she argued, was driven by a refusal to 
be reconciled to alienation, finding it not primarily in economic relations but in the 
hypocrisy of bourgeois society, and in human existence, “uncertain, incoherent” and 
embedded in an “incomprehensible universe”.125 Revolutionary action was more 
about endowing the world with “humanly comprehensible meaning” than changing 
social and economic conditions.126 The utopian character of “this attempt to save one's 
soul through political action” prevented it from formulating political principles and 
directing political choices.127 Arendt claimed that such revolutionary action was 
intended to allow men to dwell in an “entirely humanized, man-made reality, so that 
the absurdity of human life will cease to exist”. But for the French existentialists, she 
argued, absurdity would not cease for individuals, but instead “for mankind in the 
midst of the human artifice”.128 She argued that this slippage from the individual to an 
illusory collective humanity concealed the “extreme subjectivism of Cartesian 
philosophy” that found here “its last and most radical expression”.129 This subjectivist 
worldlessness led to a desperation to find meaning in history, exacerbated by the 
brutal and seemingly meaningless events of the twentieth century. It provided ideal 
conditions for a renewed interest in Hegel’s thought.130 She was employing a reading 
of Hegel developed in parallel with her critique of Marx since 1951. 
Taking political phenomena seriously without abandoning a concept of 
transcendent truth or succumbing to overly optimistic hopes of progress, the Hegelian 
approach, Arendt argued, did not claim as Marx did that conscious human action 
could drive world-historical change. In Hegel’s philosophy of history humans could 
not control the outcomes of their actions on such a scale, because, she noted, they 
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could “never have reliable control over the actions they have begun and can never 
fully realise their original intentions”.131 This view of the tragic fallibility of action, 
derived especially from his chapter on “Spirit” in Phenomenology of Spirit, had a 
significant influence on Arendt.132  
She also recognised the influence of Hegel’s tragic view of action on Merleau-
Ponty. In notes taken on Humanisme et Terreur for her 1954 APSA paper, she copied 
out his remark that ‘the nightmare of involuntary responsibility and guilt over one’s 
position that underlay the Oedipal myth’, and his approving reference to Hegel’s view 
of Greek tragedy, which ‘has beneath it this idea of a fundamental chance which 
renders us guilty and totally innocent, because we know not what we do’.133 
However, while finding, as Merleau-Ponty did, Hegel’s emphasis on the tragedy of 
subjective unpredictability appealing, she argued that he ultimately stripped events 
and deeds of their human meaning by subsuming them into a grander historical 
process. Twentieth-century Hegelianism had been used to support quixotic attempts to 
find a home for humanity amidst radical upheavals, fostering a tragic mode of 
reconciliation to a historical process that seemed inescapably dominated by violence. 
While superficially enabling for action, this determination to find meaning in violence 
embedded in a temporal flow was easily transformed, she suggested, into self-
defeating, instrumental and ideological treatments of history.134 
The roots of the notion of history as a devoluntarising flow, Arendt argued, 
fundamentally lay in Hegel. He was the first, she claimed, to interpret the past as 
“history”, rather than a series of disconnected events, recuperating meaning from 
history without relying on divine guarantee.135 In one of her earliest readings of 
Hegel, from 1951, she noted that in his thought politics only “became reconciled in 
history” on the assumption that history was a process, given meaning and a rationale 
as the means by which the World Spirit “reveals itself through the human 
consciousness” as a truth that transcended politics, sublimating the contingency of 
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events into a universal dialectic driven by Providence.136 This was not reconciliation 
to specific “events”, but rather general, tragic reconciliation to world-historical 
processes, leaving no space for discriminating judgment. Arendt's objection to French 
interpretations of Hegel and Marx’s thought was not that they were too historical, but 
that they were not aware of the central features of their historical situation, or 
“historicity”.137 She remarked that even when they adopted Heidegger’s notion of 
historicity – the radical temporal structure of existence – they granted it a ‘much 
stronger Hegelian flavour’ that involved regressing to older forms of comprehensive 
philosophies of history exemplified by both Hegel and Marx. In the wake of 
totalitarianism, reconciliation to the rupture represented by Nazism and Stalinism 
seemed absurd. In a barb implicitly directed at Humanism and Terror, she asked how 
anyone could “dare to reconcile himself with the reality of extermination camps or 
play the game of thesis-antithesis-synthesis until his dialectics have discovered 
“meaning” in slave labour?”.138 
For Arendt, the subsumption of cataclysmic events into a purported stream of 
history was characteristic of modern philosophies of history. This was not solely due 
to the appeal of teleological historical schemes. The search for stable frameworks of 
historical meaning among French thinkers had encouraged recourse to the Hegelian 
presentation of historical time as a constant flow. Events only acquired meaning 
through their place in causal relationships or grand processes.139 Rather than allowing 
this to generate fatalism, French had applied the Cartesian tendencies that she 
identified in French existentialism to argue for the possibility of radical freedom 
through a break with historical necessity. The result was an instrumental model of 
historical change, rooted in Marx’s radicalisation of Hegel, placing the violence that 
resulted from this instrumentality at the heart of historical consciousness. The 
historical legitimation of violence, she suggested, lay at the heart not only of 
Marxism, but modern historical consciousness in general. Reconciliation to the fact of 
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violence had ultimately led to ideological justifications of terror. 140 For Arendt, 
understanding and coming to terms with twentieth-century violence became the 
central task of any political mode of approaching the past.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Against the justification of violence she discerned in modern historical 
consciousness, in the early 1950s Arendt developed concepts of reconciliation and 
non-reconciliation to propose that historical method in political theory focus on 
fidelity to the singularity and difference of past events, rather than the purported flow 
of macro-historical processes. This mode of historical understanding would form the 
basis of her later theory of judgment. This was not a systematic historical theory, and 
as she acknowledged to Voegelin in 1953, she thought it difficult to translate into 
historical writing. Nevertheless, the extent to which she did not possess a coherent 
concept of history in the early 1950s should not be overstated.  
There were three aspects to her historical sense: first, reconciliation and non-
reconciliation as ways of conceiving of the judgment of phenomena; second, “events” 
as the most significant historical phenomena, and third, a hermeneutic relation to 
events. This form of relationship to the past would help individuals be reconciled to 
the world, and would ground future political action in a manner that militated against 
nihilistic voluntarism and revolutionary violence. Historical understanding – in 
addition to the aesthetic judgment she stressed in her much later Kant lectures – was 
an important stage in the formation of her theory of judgment.141 
A key, neglected element in the development of Arendt’s political theory was her 
critique of violence and treatment of Marxism. As the transition from Origins to 
“Totalitarian Elements of Marxism” shows, she shifted from a metaphysical and 
phenomenological argument about violence generated by nihilism to a philosophical-
historical one emphasising its mediation through historical consciousness. What was 
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new in her writing was the tension between a need for historical reconciliation, and 
the historical reality of violence. Modern politics, she argued, was dominated by 
imperialism, nihilism, racism and violence. Neither these phenomena, nor the 
continuing existence of the elements of totalitarianism – deracination, exploitation, 
the superfluity of individuals – ought to be reconciled to by political actors. Yet non-
reconciliation to existing circumstances seemed to preclude understanding of the past 
in a way that grounded responsibility rather than nihilistic voluntarism and 
revolutionary violence. 
The tension between reconciliation and non-reconciliation to circumstances 
became more apparent as Arendt went beyond her theory of totalitarianism to theorise 
the forms of necessity that obstructed political freedom. Here she drew on Marx’s 
thought more than has been recognised.142 Her questionable interpretation of his 
concept of labour as quasi-biological treated it not as an illusory category, but as a 
reality that conditioned individuals in mass society to pursue private interests rather 
than participating in politics. The intellectual context for “Totalitarian Elements of 
Marxism” clarifies the reasons for this. Marx’s appeal across the world, she noted, 
was that his analysis of capitalism and concept of labour possessed a great degree of 
historical and anthropological truth. She engaged with him as an acute historical 
thinker, reading him through a lens that allowed the possibility that an “end of 
history” might come about, resulting in universal mass societies devoid of a public 
realm. This would render humans superfluous, as the “free, labourless man who is 
supposed to emerge after the end of history would simply have lost his most 
essentially human capacity”.143  
Arendt’s reading of Marx cemented a pessimistic narrative of modernity, focused 
on the emergence of mass societies and pervasiveness of violence that was in some 
respects as determinist as his. Yet while her critique of mass society had elitist 
implications for her attitude toward democracy, her critique of Hegelian Marxism 
highlights the extent to which these commitments did not emerge from a conventional 
anti-totalitarian analysis of the kind presented by Karl Popper and Jacob Talmon.144 It 
was in fact shaped more by a more radical French intellectual milieu. 
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Finally, the historical dimensions of Arendt's reading of Hegel and Marx reveal her 
sustained interest in the relationship between modern history and violence, and its 
importance to her later political theory.145 In On Violence she would critique the use 
of violence by revolutionaries and anti-colonial movements, and its justification by 
Sartre and Fanon.146 But she also dealt with similar themes in On Revolution, Between 
Past and Future, and to a lesser extent, in The Human Condition.147 She noted that the 
debates over violence in the protest movements of 1968 only showed “to what an 
extent Hegel's concept of history dominates the thought of Marxists and non-Marxists 
alike”.148 The origins of this critique of violence, especially in relation to Sartre’s 
Critique of Dialectical Reason, lay in her interpretations of Hegel and Marx. 
In her analyses of political authority and violence Arendt noted that modern 
regimes legitimised their authority with reference to the course of history, whether 
towards classless or merely more economically prosperous societies.149 She also noted 
that both communist and democratic regimes encouraged Weberian definitions of 
political power and authority in terms of a monopoly of legitimately exercised 
violence. As this essay has shown, she understood this nexus of violence and 
authority to be historically legitimated. Mass societies conceived of themselves 
moving through time according to loosely Marxian notions of quasi-naturalised 
historical change. She defined “events”, representing the possibility of political 
freedom, against this flow. But as Martin Jay has noted, there were unavoidable 
affinities between the practice of violence and the “new beginnings” she hoped would 
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found new forms of political authority and replace rule by historically-legitimated 
force.150  
The temporal aspects of the idealised polis Arendt would describe in The Human 
Condition could mitigate the problem of legitimacy; authority could be sustained 
through practices of remembrance and storytelling directed at founding events and 
political institutions, rather than repeated violent or disruptive political action. Yet 
remembrance and storytelling provide limited purchase on the basic tension between 
violence and the founding of a decent polity. Her concept of reconciliation, however, 
as a spur to both historical interpretation and active political judgment, suggested the 
possibility of an outright refusal of violent founding acts. More than remembrance or 
storytelling, it presented a historically-sensitive refusal, directed at political 
phenomena and arrangements founded on violence. Though a problematic and 
“monumental” historian, as Judith Shklar described her, Arendt had a concrete sense 
of history not only as a means of spurring action through remembrance of past noble 
deeds, but also as a way of cultivating, modelling, and even practicing political 
judgment.151 
                                                
150 The slaying of Remus by Romulus in the Roman myth of founding, for example. See Jay, “The 
Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt”, 248. 
151 Judith N Shklar, “Rethinking the Past”, Social Research 44.1 (1977), 80-81. 
